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SENTIMENTS

ON A

WAR WITH FRANCE.

[Price One Shilling.]

BRITISH MUSEUM

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WAR WITH FRANCE.

THE writer of theſe ſheets would have confined himſelf to that ſilence on political ſubjects, which, to him always appeared the duty of individuals in a repreſentative government, if what is called an appeal to the public opinion had not of late been practiſed (perhaps too much) both by adminiſtration and its opponents; from this practice he infers the liberty, if not the duty, of employing his feeble talent on a ſubject ſo intereſting, and on which peoples minds appear juſt now in a nice equilibrium. At firſt view, peace

muſt appear moſt deſirable to all men, more particularly to thoſe engaged in commerce and manufactures; but if attended with circumſtances which threaten to produce hereafter a war more dangerous and difficult to encounter than what might now be apprehended, it would change its appearance and ſeem as improvident as the conduct of one who ſhould heſitate to ſtrip and repair the roof of his houſe, which he ſuſpects needs it, till it is paſt repair, and brings ruin on the whole building. That this is our preſent caſe, will, perhaps, ſeem at leaſt likely, if not certain, to others as it does to me, from the following conſiderations. The ill intentions of the French democrates, towards Great Britain, ſhone forth at an early period of the firſt or conſtituent aſſembly, when the warm advocates of that ſyſtem, which was even then hatching, though it has not

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till lately burſt its ſhell, and aſtoniſhed the world with the birth of a monſter, rejected with diſdain the arguments which that zealous aſſertor of real rational liberty, Mr. Maloüet, drew from the principles and practice of our excellent conſtitution; and when repeated complaints were made of the treachery of thoſe who had made the Commercial Treaty with this country, the advantages derived to us from it, exaggerated, and dwelt on with moſt evident diſcontent and jealouſy. And when waggons, conveying Engliſh goods from Calais to Paris, were burnt at Abbeville, to the amount of 8000l. ſterling value, and no recompence made to the owners, nor puniſhment inflicted on the offenders; the ſubſequent or Legiſlative Aſſembly, and the Convention, have continually advanced in the ſame line of conduct, and have certainly done that which is the moſt groſs

offence poſſible, and even more inimical than any war, the attempting to excite diviſions in the very boſom of this nation, and to poiſon in its ſource that true love of our country which hitherto has enabled this little iſland not only to ſupport the attacks of many and powerful enemies, but to ſhine in war with a luſtre which has magnified her in the eyes of the whole world, and made it difficult to diſtant powers to believe that it was *indeed* ſo ſmall a ſpeck on the face of the globe which ſent forth ſuch ſplendor over the whole of it. It is in vain that any one ſhould ſuggeſt a motive of fraternity (the cant word of theſe falſe apoſtles) unleſs it be that only fraternity they have practiſed the fraternity of Cain;—like him they view with a diabolical jealouſy the virtues and the happineſs of their neighbours, and in order to deſtroy them, have violated, and

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ſtill are ready to violate, every rule of juſtice, humanity, and religion.

Had not mention indeed been made of us, the examples of others ought to warn us of the fire concealed under the aſhes whereon we tread. They beheld the mild government, the eaſe, and the abundance of the ſtate of Avignon; their rapacity and envy ſoon found pretexts to plunder its towns, and turn its gardens into a wilderneſs. It has been long known by experience, that the Savoyards filled the moſt laborious offices, together with thoſe of great truſt in Paris, preſerving ever the reputation of honeſty unſullied. Neither the barreneſs of their country, the exact neutrality of their ſovereign, nor the induſtry and ſimplicity of the Savoyards, could cool the zeal of theſe benefactors of human kind; it was a neceſſity impoſed

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on them to undeceive and deſtroy their fond and fooliſh loyalty. The labourer is worthy of his hire; it was little to recompenſe their labours with the plunder of the city of Nice, where their prepoſſeſſion in favour of Engliſhmen, however, muſt be allowed to have ſhone conſpicuouſly; in that they only plundered them of every thing, even to their cloathing, openly, and before their own eyes, and permitted them to eſcape with life on condition of not murmuring. Geneva is not worthy to be dwelt long upon, though it would make all in favour of my argument; the General who uſed there a little moderation having been baniſhed therefore. The canton of Berne is too wiſe and too ſtrong for them. Spain, who has ſuffered long a trembling and inglorious peace through motives of humanity, is now, it is hoped, arouſed, and will ſhew a Caſtilian generoſity and

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indignation. But Belgia! it is there that France gathers laurels; it is there ſhe diſpenſes wiſdom, philoſophy, and benevolence. The French found there a people whom former induſtry had made rich, but whom riches had made inſolent; whom the love of order had attached to their old eſtabliſhments and privileges; whom the zeal of religion had a little miſled into ſuperſtition; whom the dominion of a diſtant prince inclined to envy; whom their former Emperor had irritated by enforcing ſpeculative reforms with obſtinate violence, and who had not yet recovered from the tumult of reſiſtance; who were governed and commanded by a Deputy, neither warrior, nor politician; and who inhabited a country fertile, flat, and thickly ſet with large ill-fortified towns. Here the olive-branch of fraternity ſoon deluded many of the unwary to their ſtandard.

Theſe

Theſe ſerved at once as ſpies and as guides, and brought an army of 80,000 French, with a heavy train of artillery, within the reach of 18,000 Auſtrians, whom they did indeed oblige to retreat, but not till after they had ſlain fully their own number of the French; the torrent of prejudice and enthuſiaſm, the hyperbolical reports of ſucceſs, drove all before them, and gave them poſſeſſion of thoſe wealthy and once happy provinces.—How did they uſe their vaunted victory? They ſoon *converted* the Belgians from all their former vices, and from their virtues too; Civic feaſts, antic ceremonies, popular aſſemblies, clubs, &c. have put induſtry out of countenance; riches moulder away under contributions levied already to double the amount of their former impoſts, under aſſignats or forced paper currency, under confiſcations and billeting of ſoldiers. In-

ſolence

ſolence is repreſſed, but by inſults which none but French conquerors could offer, and none could ſubmit to but thoſe whom their own folly, as much as the force of their enemy, had vanquiſhed. Order and eſtabliſhment of every ſort are baniſhed with all their adherents, and a repreſentation forced on the people in oppoſition to their wiſhes moſt poſitively declared. Superſtition, and even religion, has vaniſhed before theſe enlightened champions of regeneration, and left them its treaſures and poſſeſſions for their own booty; all ſpirit of oppoſition to a diſtant Prince is well quelled by the authority of the 700 tyrants of Paris, who fulminate decrees, againſt which to murmer, to think, or ſeem to think, is puniſhed with dragoons, dungeons or death. But they will make them amends, they will give them the navigation of the Schelt, they will conquer Holland, and

what they pleaſe of Germany; they will make Belgia the centre of their empire, allow it a place among their departments, and a *ſhare in their debts.*

When they have leiſure, they will come and regenerate the Engliſh; for ſo their Cato's have promiſed. Having felt our pulſe, and found us not quite ripe and ready for the operation, they have granted us a reſpite, but we muſt not expect total exemption; ſo near and ſo infectious a neighbour they would certainly bear no longer than they could not poſſibly help it. It ſuffices them for the preſent to draw us into negociation, a dangerous and difficult paſſage, where the ductile and deſigning diſpoſition of the French has never failed to ſtrand the frank and unſuſpecting Engliſh; but if it now happens to us to

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get aground, we ſhall indeed do it with our eyes open.

Their decrees and their explanations are a palpable contradiction to each other, which, while it marks at once their baſeneſs and their ſhameleſs effrontery, leaves them in poſſeſſion of a complete liberty, hereafter to adhere to that of the two which ſuits the occaſion of the moment; but the diſtinction they have to the laſt attempted to keep up between the government and the people, ſhews plainly enough what is their future aim. Independant however, of all other matters, the Auſtrian Netherlands, in the hands of the French, muſt for ever be, as in all time paſt, an object of the utmoſt ſolicitude in the eyes of the nation, and ſuch as it is impoſſible for us to acquieſce under without ſurrendering our own independance; or at beſt, holding it

on ſuch terms as the French, in their mercy will pleaſe to allow us. They promiſe, it is ſaid, to recede from Brabant at a proper opportunity ; it is very likely that thoſe whom repreſentation, remonſtrance, and even preparations, for a ſerious attack, could not prevail upon to quit the precarious footing they now have in thoſe countries, will, after eſtabliſhing themſelves firmly, quit them of their own good-will ! great confidence is certainly to be placed in the aſſurances of a democracy, which changes its executive government with every moon, with every caprice, of the mob, and who reſerves to itſelf the convenient evaſion of diſowning whatever has been done by the miniſters or generals whom it has diſplaced, and whom it never fails to diſplace whenever their conduct, ſavours of juſtice or moderation. We ought forſooth to expect equitable and liberable conditions from

from thoſe who have ſo cruelly treated the confiding Brabanters, who have obliged them to drive away the emigrants whom they had ſheltered, and to give up their property which they had taken in truſt, and moreover, to ſurrender to confiſcation all the landed property of all thoſe of their own country whom they could frighten away. We who have given refuge and even ſupport to ſo many thouſands of emigrants! could we likewiſe bear to be forbidden the exerciſe of our favourite paſſions of pity and benevolence? And if even terms of amity could be fixed on, could we bear a Jacobin Ambaſſador at London? I am almoſt aſhamed to compare ſuch a ſet of wretches to the ancient Romans; but we muſt remember that even that great people had for their founders a ſet of banditti. Impregnated with the ſame ſenſe of juſtice and benevolence as the French, they ſet

about

about ameliorating the ſtate of the bordering people by taking them into their Republic; and whilſt they carried on their views of aggrandizement with aſtoniſhing prudence and perſeverance, the different nations who might have united and cruſhed them, temporized and treated, as many would wiſh this nation now to do, and gave time for the Romans to attack them ſingly, and conquer all. But the preſent poſition of affairs favours much more ſuch a conduct on the part of the French, and they ſeem to be fully aware of it. They have hitherto proved it eaſy to delude the lower ſort of people in moſt countries, and by the fame of their outrage and barbarity to frighten the rich; they have overrun the Auſtrian Netherlands, not only with little difficulty or loſs, but to their great gain in men, money, and ammunition. Perhaps ere this writing ſees the

light

light they will have made a conſiderable progreſs in Holland, and, turning upon us the force of our ally, will ere long puniſh us as we deſerve for our ſelfiſh and time-ſerving politics. Then will it be ſeen how careful thoſe have been for the preſervation of our commerce who have cauſed us to heſitate whilſt an immenſe tract of coaſt, full of harbours, and already rivalling us in trade and maritime force, has fallen into the hands of our determined enemies; then will our merchants curſe their ſhort-ſighted views of advantage, and learn what their traffic ſhould long ſince have taught them, that moſt benefits to be laſting muſt be reciprocal.—That as the nation has by moſt coſtly and ſtraining exertions, and by truly ſweating blood for them, advanced their condition to a degree of proſperity and even of grandeur, hitherto unknown in the world,

world, ſo it is right and needful that they ſhould at times freely and chearfully aid the warrior and politician in their ſtruggles, ſacrifice their private to the public advantage, lay aſide their gain for a time to reſume it afterwards with greater ſecurity and ſucceſs, caſt their bread on the waters that they may find it again after many days, remembering that at the concluſion of every war, ſucceſsful or unſucceſsful, ſtipulations have always been made in favour of our commerce, which have given occaſion to its riſing again with renovated vigour.—But I had almoſt forgot that I ſpeak to thoſe honourable citizens who have already ſubſcribed liberally to aſſiſt in the manning of our fleet, who have in former wars covered the ſeas with their privateers, and enhanced the naval glories of the nation, and who will now, I doubt not,

not, ſtart forth with their uſual ſpirit. I ſhould addreſs rather the timid, who fear that the French privateers will come out in ſwarms and ſweep all our trade before them; and ſhould remind them, that both from duty and inclination, our Miniſtry have already equipped, and will conſtantly keep frigates, and ſmall armed veſſels, cruiſing to intercept theſe ſpoilers, and protect our merchant veſſels; it is confidently believed that this meaſure has already been attended with ſucceſs.

I ſhould addreſs thoſe inauſpicious politicians, who tell us, the French have nothing which they can loſe or we can gain. I ſhould aſk them, if they count for nothing the trade of Nants, St. Maloes, and Bourdeaux; the iſlands of the Weſt-Indies who ſtretch out their hands to us for pro-

tection; and if they ſet no value on the trade of the Mediterranean, where the French have long rivalled, nay ſurpaſſed us, but where we muſt no longer dare to rival them, if we ſuffer to ſubſiſt the deſpotic domination they have claimed, and would have eſtabliſhed, in thoſe ſeas, if the elements had not for a moment checked their inſolence. I ſhould addreſs, if any thing could touch them, thoſe diſcontented and factious men, who ſicken at the ſight of thoſe glories which others have earned by conducting the nation from abject diſtreſs, to unhoped for proſperity, who ſee no other means of riſing to notice themſelves but thoſe of embarraſſing the adminiſtration of public affairs. I ſhould intreat them not to magnify the power of the French, which I am ſure they do not believe, nor to repeat the vaunts of the national convention, that they will raiſe

500,000

500,000 men, whom famine indeed might drive to their armies, but whom they can neither clothe, feed, arm, nor pay; ſtill more earneſtly do I intreat them not to attempt raiſing a ſpirit of diſcontent among our people, who certainly enjoy a degree of eaſe and plenty, unexampled in any country, and contraſted by that of the French in ſuch a manner as to excite the compaſſion even of their enemies; but more than all, not to depreſs the generous courage of Britons, by telling them the enemy they have always braved is now to be dreaded, and treated with under apprehenſions; in fine, not to make their native country ſuch that themſelves muſt deſpiſe it. But I would intreat them to give themſelves and their countrymen leave to be happy, though it be with a happineſs which they did not make, and which they cannot mar;

but it is in vain, they have withſtood the eloquence of thoſe who charm far more wiſely than I; they are determined to be the objects of popular admiration, or to periſh; they are bent and fully reſolved (if thoſe whom they deteſt do not preſerve them from themſelves) to run the race and find the reward of the Mouniers and Laly Tollendals, who have been put to flight; of the Fayettes and Monteſquious, who are diſgraced and proſcribed; of the Clermont Tonnerres and the Rochefoucaults, who are murdered.

It would be tedious to dwell longer on the impolicy and impracticability of treaty or peace. I hope the French, hurried on by their wild impatience in declaring war, have burſt for us the inextricable labyrinth of negotiation, have taught us to draw the ſword and throw away the ſcabbard, and

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by their phrenzy delivered us from the effects of their fraudulency. Let us turn our eyes to the expediency, the practicability, the advantage, the duty, the glory, of a war with France. And here the difficulty lies, not in finding but in chuſing out of the multitude that will occur to every man's mind, reaſons to perſuade the doubtful, and confirm thoſe who have already determined in favour of a war.

That a war is expedient will follow of courſe from thoſe arguments which are adduced againſt pacific meaſures; to them may be added, amongſt others, the following: The ſpirit of aggrandizement, which has ever characterized the French, is ſo far from being diminiſhed by the philoſophy they have affected to preach, that it has ſwelled much beyond its uſual bounds, and every democrat now ſtruts a ſovereign. It

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is not without reaſon that every govern-ment in Europe is on the watch to take their bias from us, and if we give way may all likewiſe do ſo, one after another, till Gallic miſrule overwhelms all; civi-lization will proceed in rapid decay as it now does in France, and a night of Gothic barbariſm will again overcloud the weſtern world. Laws of nations and laws both of God and man muſt ſink before this potent ſpell, as they have already done where its influence has reached. Shocking as this repreſentation is, I fear it is far too likely; but ſuppoſe ſo great enormities ſhould not take place, yet merely to obtain the poſſeſ-ſion of or even a preponderating influence in Belgia is what we can never in ſafety give up to the French. But knowing the tyranny they exerciſe, and the hatred they have incurred there; knowing the deſire the Belgians had and fully expreſſed a few

years

years ago to accept the protection of the Engliſh and the King of Pruſſia, and to enter into cloſe alliances with them, and which deſire it would be eaſy to prove ſtill exiſting in a great part of that nation; we cannot fail to ſee the probability of their turning againſt the French at the firſt news of the Engliſh declaring war. It is well known to all who have read the hiſtory of England, that whilſt we had the alliance of the Earls of Flanders we kept France in awe as much or more than they have the Dutch, ſince they had poſſeſſion of the ſame country. If this country can be delivered from the French, whether it become an independent ſtate, as the former inclinations of the Emperor Joſeph, and thoſe of his nephew and pupil the preſent Emperor, render likely, or whether it returns on terms of reaſonable liberty to its old poſſeſſors, it muſt certainly become cloſely

cloſely allied to us, and for ever hereafter prove a moſt uſeful check on our turbulent neighbours. Moreover, the other nations of Europe, who have heretofore been jealous of Great Britain, it appears are now deſirous to take her for their leader, and on that ground to offer her commercial advantages, in particular Spain and Ruſſia. The war in queſtion is practicable with more chance of ſucceſs and leſs detriment than ordinary, becauſe the nations whoſe oppoſition at former periods has been moſt prejudicial to us will be on our ſide, becauſe our ſhare of it will be carried on moſtly, if not entirely, by ſea, where our exertions are really and permanently beneficial to us, and moſt of the expences center in our own country; but above all, becauſe the war is popular. Even the lower claſſes of people in this country are thought by other countries to reaſon with more

more ſolidity than thoſe of their own; I have always thought ſo, and moſt heartily rejoice to ſee the proof before my eyes; they have viewed, and rejected with diſdain the attempts made by the French, and Frenchified Engliſhmen, to miſlead them into folly and injuſtice; they ſhudder at the crimes, and deteſt more than ever the perſons of their inveterate enemies; they fly with zeal to our ſtandards, they man our ſhips with an alacrity never more experienced: God forbid that any thing ſhould check this noble ardor! their exemplary benevolence to the French emigrants, and their tears for Louis XVI. together with their execration of the oppreſſive and cruel democrats of France, ſhew that they conſider the war as a war of principle; their uncorrupted reaſon, refuſes to ſeparate the deteſtation of villainy from the deſire of puniſhing it; woe be to

thoſe who would ſubtilize and refine away this ſtrong colouring of virtue, and lead the maſs of the people to conſider that jacobiniſm, which their ſuperiors behold with apathy, no longer as an object of abhorrence. The loſſes of the French are already calculated at 250,000 men, how many more will diſorder, neglect of agriculture, and famine, with the addition of another war, and a more active enemy, ſoon deſtroy!

The advantages of this war have been ſlightly touched on above, in mentioning the trade of St. Malo, Nants, Bourdeaux, and the Weſt-India iſlands, and the Mediterranean; but it is not only to capture the ſhips engaged in the trade of thoſe places that we ſhould aim, we ſhould, and may ſo much diſtreſs their marine, as to turn the trade itſelf into channels of our own, where the addreſs, integrity, and extenſive

extenſive credit of our merchants will long keep it, that of the Weſt-India iſlands perhaps for ever; the French manufactures have already ſuffered greatly by the war, the continuance will ruin them quite. The poſſeſſions of the French in the Eaſt-Indies, though of no great value, would immediately fall into our hands, and if we can keep the French from returning thither, we ſhould be ſaved from many a war, where their intrigues have heretofore raiſed cruel wars againſt us; ſome advantages might likewiſe be gained on the coaſt of Africa. I do not mention as an *advantage* the opportunity we have of taking revenge for the injuries done in America, but I may well mention them as a *juſtification* of whatever ills we may now bring on our foes; and here it is worth while to remark, that the ſame faction who brought on the late revolution in France

were thoſe who began plotting to cauſe diſturbances in America immediately after the peace of Paris in 1762; they firſt obtained a name of diſtinction in the adminiſtration of Turgot, that of Œconomiſts; under the cloak of which, they began to ſuggeſt many of the extravagancies which have ſince been put into real execution; and at that time, a ſong was made in ridicule of them, and which is yet well known in France, wherein the confuſion which now appears, is predicted, as ariſing neceſſarily from ſuch principles; two perſons, who came much more prominently forward on the canvas after that time were M. Necker and M. De la Fayette, who now are ſunk into the ſhade of a too late repentance; but it is ſtill more remarkable that the unfortunate monarch, who has juſt fallen a martyr to his own goodneſs, long heſitated to ſign the the fatal treaty with America, and when, after

after long importunity, he did it, ſaid, "*We ſhall all live to repent it.*"

I cannot quit this ſubject without remarking further, that Paine (of whom no doubt we complain with reaſon) has however done ſome credit to the character of an Engliſhman, even in the worſt of ſituations, by rejecting the ſentence of death againſt the unfortunate Louis, demanding baniſhment, which in his poſition would have been an act of mercy; at the ſame time aſſuring the National Convention, who were ſending an Ambaſſador to the ſtates of America, that he would be received with diſguſt if he brought tidings of the death of their benefactor.—May we be not ſo fortunate as to ſeize the occaſion, and detach the Americans for ever from the French? Do we not indeed deſerve that the improvement of our manufactures

factures and the decay of the French ſhould inſure their commerce to us?

I come now to a point, on which there are various opinions, and where, I fear, my own will not be univerſally reliſhed; it is, however, with ſincerity and confidence I declare this war to be our duty. The ſupport of our allies, the Dutch, is agreed on by all parties as indiſpenſable, if aſked; but this requiſition has been held uncertain, it may not have been done with all the form that is uſual, but terror would well account for this. We know, moreover well that there has long exiſted a party in that country which is more attached to French than Engliſh alliance. Did we heretofore in 1786 think that a reaſon for abandoning Holland to the French? or ſhould we do it now? Though all people ſee the danger of the French poſſeſſing Belgia,

Belgia, yet ſome ſay we ought not to require them to give it up, for that we did not check the Emperor and King of Pruſſia's invaſion of France; but do they not ſee the difference?—Thoſe Princes never pretended to make conqueſts; and it is by many thought that the neglecting to take in a broader ſpace of country, and having ſo *long* and at the ſame time ſo *narrow* a line of communication with Germany, was the moſt urgent reaſon for the Duke of Brunſwick's retreat. Be this as it may, the tyranny exerciſed over the Belgians, and the complaints which in their anguiſh they have ſent forth, even with the ſword at their throats, is a good reaſon, even according to Conventional maxims, for interfering; and the danger brought on ourſelves and our allies will juſtify us in the eyes of all other nations.

It has been ſaid, and I think much too eaſily admitted, that we have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of France. I do not pretend that example is a deciſive proof of right, but it certainly muſt have its weight, this nation has been moſt exemplarily moderate in intermeddling with its neighbours, which the French themſelves are forced to allow, yet ſometimes ſhe has interpoſed, and with the approbation of all men; but France has ſuffered no neighbour to be quiet; Spain, Germany, Pruſſia, Poland, Savoy, Italy, Corſica, Geneva, Holland, have wept her intrigues in tears of blood; but England is, and ever has been, the favorite object of her machinations, nor let it be pretended, that her ſyſtem is altered, ſince in ſpite of miſinterpration, it will ſtill appear that her revolutioniſts are the ſame who formented the diviſions between this country and America,

and

and ſince at this very moment, when ſhe has moſt deſire as well as moſt need to lull us to ſleep, her petulance forces her ſtill to talk of publiſhing addreſſes to the people, and coming with fifty thouſand ſans culottes to plant the tree of liberty.—Where?—In the ſoil where, foſtered by induſtry and moderation, pruned and cleared from weeds by the hands of wiſdom and diſcretion, ſhe has long borne fruit which the French have devoured with their eyes, but which their unhallowed hands can never touch.—They promiſe to bring and leave us caps of liberty! From ſuch *mad caps* the Lord deliver us! If they do indeed come, let us hope they will prove miſtaken, and leave their *heads* behind them!—To all who believe in any ſort of religion, it is evident that either a general or particular Providence rules the courſe of human affairs, and has implanted in our breaſts a ſenſe of right and wrong. Shall it be in vain then that every nerve thrills with horror at the recital of the more than ſavage cruelties of the French; that every mind feels humilia-

tion and debaſement at the reflection that any of the ſame ſpecies prove capable of ſuch diabolical practices! I will not ſhock the public ear with a recapitulation of their atrocious acts, nor add thereto aggravations thereof, which I know, and which are yet known but to a few. Indignation flies already through all ranks of men. All cry out "Can we ſit by as quiet ſpectators of ſuch ſcenes!" All offer their lives and fortunes to be inſtruments in the hands of Providence for redreſſing the grievances under which human nature groans! I cannot believe that even policy (if policy it were, whereas it ſeems totally impolitic) could have a right to fruſtrate or to ſtifle theſe emotions. All people believe we have the means as well as the inclination; let us be thankful for them, and make a proper uſe of them; let ſelf-intereſt ſleep awhile, or rather let us agree with Pope, that ſelf-love and ſocial-love are the ſame. Not only the thouſands of emigrants who harraſs our ſouls with their diſtreſſes here, and thoſe whoſe miſery ſtalks through every neutral

neutral nation, but many thouſands in helpleſs diſtreſs and dejection remaining ſtill in France, (who as often as they can or dare make their ſighs heard,) crave ſuccour from us, and look up to us as their only hope under Heaven. Let us then open our eyes to the glory which will attend a liberal conduct, a noble devotion to an excellent cauſe; let us contemplate with a commendable vanity the applauſes of all, nay, even of our enemies; but above all, that which many have thought the ſufficient, as it is the trueſt, recompence of virtue, the conſciouſneſs of a good deed.

Some fondly hope that armed negotiation may effect all good purpoſes. I dare not hope it—but if it is to be attempted, I do ſincerely hope, that a King, who muſt feel, and ought to exult in the love and confidence of his people, will do juſtice to their ſentiments, and ſheath not the ſword till oppreſſed humanity be effectually relieved! that neither he nor his adviſers will be cajoled with profeſſions of eſteem. It has

has ever been the privilege of virtue to be venerated by vice, but never till now had vice the audacity to aſk a return of affection, and propoſe a fraternity.

Thoſe French, whom no principle reſtrains, have already begun hoſtilities—it will be unpardonable to let them retain a day the advantage which attends a bold aggreſſion.

If after all, this deſire for war be accuſed of Quixotiſm, it will find its defence in thouſands of examples of ſacred and profane hiſtory, and in the probability of ſucceſs wherewith it is undertaken; but ſhould it even prove unſucceſsful I ſhould ſtill glory in the attempt, though I ſunk in it; and would rather ſee my country become a deſert and the abode of wild beaſts, than inhabit it with men more falſe than foxes, more ſavage than tigers.

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